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Using the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) as a case study, this
paper examines how conflicting objectives in procurement policies by public space agencies
result in anti-competitive procurement. Globally, public sectors have actively encouraged
mergers and acquisitions of major contractors at the national level, since the end of the “Cold
War”, following largely from the perceived benefits of economies of size. The paper examines
the impact the resulting industrial concentration has on the ability of space agencies to follow
a pro-competitive procurement policy. Using time series econometric analysis, the paper
shows that NASA’s pro-competitive policy is unsuccessful due to a shift, since the mid-1990s,
in the share of appropriations in favour of its top contractors.
JEL classification codes: H57, L50, L60
Key words: procurement, space industry, space agencies, NASA
I.  Introduction
Until the 1990s, commercial space markets were small, with space spending
dominated by governments. The behavior of space agencies was then analyzed
within a traditional public choice framework. In terms of procurement choices, this
meant that the space agency followed a policy that weighed two key objectives.
The minimization of the cost of space programs and the minimization of rent to the
space industry or, put otherwise, “best value for money” for a given space program,
whose efficiency and procurement policies can be examined within a cost-benefit
approach (Stevens 1993, Mueller 1989). The only dilemma space agencies faced
was summed up in the traditional “rent vs cost minimization choice” (for a survey
see Laffont and Tirole 1993, Sandler and Hartley 1995).
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The end of the Cold War resulted in increasing commercial space applications
and the growth of an international marketplace, whose suppliers were the historically
government-dependent national space industries. The emergence of this
international marketplace introduced a third objective in this choice: the objective
of a favorable impact of national procurement policies and programs on the
competitiveness of the industry in commercial markets (Commission 2002; Zervos
2001). Combined with declining post-Cold War public space budgets, this new
objective resulted in a positive attitude towards mergers and acquisitions of space
firms in the mid-1990s. Increases in industrial concentration were expected to lead
to cost savings through economies of scale and scope, and through avoidance of
R&D duplication, making space firms more competitive in newly-developed
commercial space markets. As a result, at the level of major contractors, the US
industry was comprised of a duopoly of Boeing and Lockheed Martin since the
mid-1990s.
However, little attention was paid to the implications the introduction of this
third objective had on the ability of space agencies to attain their traditional
objectives of competition in contracting, low cost and minimum rent of space
programs. Following the results of Florens et al. (1996), which indicate higher
profits for the space industry from government procurement, the paper looks at
the procurement policies that lead to this result. Specifically, we examine whether
NASA contract procurement operates on a non-competitive basis, contradicting
NASA’s “traditional objectives” by resulting in profit-favoring, and thus explaining
the results of Florens et al. (1996). The alternative of using rent-controlling types
of contracts to account for lack of competition in tendering is another possibility
examined in this paper. The analysis however focuses on the stated importance
placed by NASA on competition in contracting, which is expected to become
increasingly difficult as the number of prime contractors is diminishing (Commission
2002: E7). A pro-competitive policy in contracting can therefore be in conflict with
active support of industrial consolidation on cost-reducing grounds. The analysis
in this paper uses time series regression to test whether NASA’s stated targets of
enhancing competition in contracting is met and affected by industrial consolidation
at contractor’s level during the mid-1990s.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II looks at the procurement
policies and dilemmas faced by NASA with regards to competition in contracting
and the types of contacts employed. Section III then presents an empirical analysis
of the determinants of competitive contracting by NASA and how its behavior
changes over time. The analysis tests in particular for the significance of variations223 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMPETITION IN SPACE AGENCY PROCUREMENT?
in the awards to the top tier of NASA contractors and whether the lack of
competition is caused by the presence of “few and big” contractors. Section IV
then looks at whether rent-control in the absence of competition can be compensated
for by the pattern of the type of contracts awarded by NASA to the industry. The
paper is summarized in Section V.
II. Background of NASA procurement policies
Space agencies are publicly funded organizations that operate under relevant
procurement policies. The choices made by a space agency like NASA include the
choice of space programs and equipment, the choice of contractor, and the choice
of contract (for a detailed discussion see Zervos 2001). In making those choices,
the agency seeks to implement the objectives of cost and rent minimization and
improvement of competitiveness of the domestic space industry.
Given that the choice of space program is largely a political decision by the
administration (a prominent example is the Apollo program), this paper focuses on
the choice of contractor (whether it is through competitive tendering and what
factors influence this process) as well as the choice of contract.
Government space programs are big business for space firms. This means that
the exclusion of a space firm from major government space programs is likely to
lead to scaling-down of operations, or even exit the market. In decreasing costs
industries, such as the space industry, competition can have controversial results.
On the one hand, it pushes in the direction of higher project costs (due to the loss
of economies of scale) while on the other hand, it enhances effort and lowers X-
inefficiency. Empirical evidence, primarily from the defence industry, point to overall
benefits from the presence of competition in contracting (Dews 1979, Lichtenberg
1995). Under closed public space markets, benefits from lack of international
competition are expected to take the form of lower production costs due to larger
scale (domestic consolidation), while costs are expected in the form of high prices
and losses associated with the presence of monopolistic domestic market structures.
Net benefits are expected in the case where efficient scale and competition is
achieved, which requires the presence of public procurement policies that are
open to overseas competition. This is not possible in the case of space programs,
as they are typically subject to national security considerations and frequently
also subject to export controls (see Commission 2002).
Different types of contracts provide a different mix of incentives towards cost
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tendering and raise adverse selection problems (the contractor that underestimates
the technical risk wins the tender, forcing the agency to renegotiate later). This
results in fixed-price contracts being unsuitable for high-risk programs. Cost-plus
contracts are thus often preferred in the presence of high risk, but raise moral
hazard problems (the contractor has no incentive to minimise costs). In sum, fixed-
price contracts and the presence of competition are factors that control costs, but
less so rent transfers. This traditional dilemma of cost vs. rent minimization in
contracting is augmented by the presence of commercial space markets to take
into account the fact that minimum rent could harm the competitive position of the
national industry in competitive markets. The same adverse effect could be
experienced by the presence of minimum cost in government programs, which
could result in highly specialized projects with less widespread development of
dual-use projects and less generic research.1
Other factors that complicate the procurement process are the level of risk of
the space program, the presence of asymmetry of information between the principal
and the agent and long-term implications (re-negotiation, follow-up and lock-in
effects). This makes the analysis of procurement behavior complicated, especially
when looking at time-series where procurement paradigms change, organizational
re-structuring occurs and new markets develop. Two factors and a policy response
affected NASA procurement behavior in the early 1990s: the diminishing
government budgets (increasing commercial markets) following the end of the
Cold War, the consolidation of the space industry and the change of NASA
procurement philosophy with the introduction of Faster-Better-Cheaper (FBC).
FBC was mainly applied to NASA developmental programs and justified on
the grounds of diminishing budgets and was designed to drive down costs of
space programs (see Norwood 1997, who also discusses the expected benefits of
this policy on commercial markets, and also Hoben 1997 for a discussion of
precursors to this approach from the 1970s). Despite successes in cutting costs
and size of exploration programs, there were a number of failures of high-profile
programs that caused criticism in terms of unacceptable high-risk-driven cost
savings, as well as major delays (Wheeler 2006).
Such policy changes can potentially impact the level of competition in
contracting, types of contracts, and ultimately affect the rent and cost of space
1 On the other hand, given the future development of commercial space programs (X-price
foundation program for suborbital launch vehicles, see Coren 2004), public requirements of
space agencies could largely be met by commercial projects resulting in budgetary savings.225 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMPETITION IN SPACE AGENCY PROCUREMENT?
programs. It is expected that FBC would result in more competitive tendering and
more fixed-price competition contracts, which could act as a counterbalance to the
consolidation of the industry and reinforce the bargaining position of NASA.
Boeing (1998) states:
Since 1994 a significant percentage of information, space and defense
systems segment business has been in developmental programs under
cost-reimbursement-type contracts, which generally have lower profits than
fixed-price-type contracts.
The inability to account fully for such factors, given the difficulties associated
with quantifying the adoption and application of such policies, is a limitation of
this analysis that must be kept in mind when interpreting the findings. The analysis
will focus on a subset of the procurement issues discussed, by first looking into
the behavior of NASA towards competition.
In the following analysis empirical evidence is presented to examine NASA’s
procurement behavior with regards to competitive tendering to the industry and
distribution of contract types.
III. Empirical analysis of competition in NASA contracting
This Section analyses the determinants of the level of competition in NASA
contracting through time. Table 1 presents a list of variables used and their
description.
Figure 1 illustrates that the first half of the 1990s saw a reversal of a pro-
competitive trend in NASA contracting, since the end of the Apollo program
(early 1970s). Though this trend changed towards the end of the 1990s, there is a
balance between competitive and non-competitive contracts awarded towards the
end of the 1990s, as opposed to the situation in 1990 when non-competitive contracts
were just 18% of the total. Overall, from 1970 to the early 1990’s, competitive
contracts are increased as a percentage of the total.
The decline in the value of NASA competitive contracts as a percentage of the
total value awarded (NASAc) in 1986 and 1987 is attributed to effects of changes in
reporting practices followed by NASA (NASA 1987: 10):
It should be recognized that a change was made in reporting categories
for this year’s report [1987] which had an impact on NASA’s reported JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 226
Note: NASAc: the value of the NASA competitive contracts as a percentage of the total
value awarded; NASAnc: the value of the NASA non-competitive contracts as a percentage
of the total value awarded. Data sources: NASA (1983) to (2004a).
Table 1. Description of time series variables
Variable Description
CPAF Cost plus award fee contracts (percentage of the total value of contracts awarded
by NASA)
CPFF Cost plus fixed fee contracts (percentage of the total value of contracts awarded
by NASA)
FFP Firm fixed price contracts (percentage of the total value of contracts awarded by
NASA)
INC Incentive contracts (percentage of the total value of contracts awarded by NASA)
NASAc Value of NASA competitive contracts as a percentage of the total value awarded;
NASAnc Value of NASA non-competitive contracts as a percentage of the total value
awarded.
NASA Contracted value to the top 10 firms as a percentage of the total appropriations
top10 made by NASA
SENASA Space appropriations made by NASA at constant 1999 prices
Note: the inclusion of the letter “L” prior to all variables denotes the log of the respective time
series (i.e., LCPAF: log of CPAF). All figures are annual.
Figure 1. Competition in NASA contracts as a percentage
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competitive performance.  In order to be consistent with established
Government wide reporting of competition statistics for Government-
owned contractor-operated facilities, we have excluded dollars
associated with the contracts for the operation of NASA’s Jet
Propulsion Laboratory from the procurements available for competition
in Fiscal Year 1987.  This reclassification of procurement awards
resulted in an increase of approximately 10 percent in NASA’s
competitive percentage for Fiscal Year 1987. Consequently, the Fiscal
Year 1986 and 1987 competition data are not completely comparable.
In contrast, from the early 1990’s until 1997 NASAc is declining, despite
consistent reporting practices (Figure 1).  In view of the consolidation of the US
space industry experienced during the same period, it seems plausible to suggest
that this consolidation had a negative effect on the percentage of competitive
contracts awarded by NASA that was not counterbalanced by FBC. The increase
in the value of the NASA non-competitive contracts as a percentage of the total
value awarded (NASAnc) towards the end of 1990s is against the spirit of the
Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) which is applied to all US federal
agencies and calls for: “...full and open competition by soliciting sealed bids or
requesting competitive proposals, or use other competitive procedures, unless a
statutory exception permits other than full and open competition...” (NASA 1985).
Such statutory exceptions are of seven general types (NASA 1997): (1) Only one
responsible source exists and no other supplies or services will satisfy agency
requirements; (2) Unusual and compelling urgency; (3) Industrial mobilization; or
engineering, development, or research capability; (4) International agreement;
(5) Statutory authorization or requirement; (6) National security; (7) Public interest.
A critical analysis of (1) to (7) would indicate that even though these types
seem to ensure the presence of competition in the vast majority of new contracts,
there are a number of reasons why they might not be sufficient.  To begin with, the
recent consolidation of the industry in the US has a direct effect on the first (1) of
these justifications, by substantially narrowing down the number of sources and
raising the possibility of collusion of space firms, given the diminished numbers.
Industrial consolidation also affects (3), since major research capabilities of
space firms are increasingly concentrated in the hands of space integrators that
have different structures and often specializing in different product areas, trying
to establish themselves in different projects and enjoy monopoly rents.
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contracts, the variables that are expected to affect it are the proportion of contracts
awarded to the top contractors through time and NASA space appropriations
(SENASA). Despite NASA’s stated pro-competitive policy, industrial consolidation
could therefore become a key factor in explaining an increasing number of contracted
values on a non-competitive basis as a percentage of the total appropriations
(NASAnc- the time series includes follow-on contracts awarded on a non-competitive
basis). In testing this hypothesis, it is important to consider the impact “mega-
mergers” of the mid-1990s had in the relationship between NASAnc, SENASA and the
value of the contracts awarded to the top 10 NASA contractors as a percentage of
the total (NASAtop10).
The econometric tests were initially performed using recursive least squares
(RLS), a method whose results are similar to OLS, but in addition tests for structural
breaks (see Doornik and Hendry 1995, and Figure 2 for details). The variables used
for the estimation were all in logarithmic form to help reduce heteroskedasticity
and normalise variables with very differently scaled data to obtain meaningful
elasticities from the estimations (LNASAnc, LSENASA and LNASAtop10 are respective
the logs of NASAnc, SENASA and NASAtop10). The data sources used for the
empirical analysis are NASA annual procurement reports (NASA 1983 to 2004a)
and NASA (2004b). The sample was chosen to start from 1974. This was due to the
fact that during the late 1960s massive appropriations to NASA were followed by
sizeable reductions in the early 1970s which meant that this era’s budgetary and
contract behaviour was atypical. This was because NASA’s original purpose of
existence, the Apollo program to send the man to the moon before the end of the
1960s, was successful. This period is characterised by the agency’s set-up costs
and massive, Apollo program-specific budgetary appropriations that were set to
decline post-1969 when the first successful mission to the moon was accomplished
and continued to do so until the mid-1970s when the program terminated. The use
of RLS reveals the presence of a structural break in 1994 (Figure 2), which leads to
the use of a step dummy variable (s1994) and a re-evaluation of the relationship
using OLS in Table 2.
 The step dummy variable is used because the size of the consolidation is only
partially captured by LNASAtop10. This is because the list of NASA’s top
contractors does not take into consideration firms, but establishments, which
means that it does not fully capture the concentration of contracts to consolidated
firms with several divisions.
As Table 2 indicates, the performance of the re-estimated model with the
incorporation of the step dummy variable to account for the consolidation of the229 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMPETITION IN SPACE AGENCY PROCUREMENT?
Figure 2. Recursive graphics
Notes: The recursive graphics are based on the recursive least squares (RLS) estimation
with LNASAnc as dependent variable and LSENASA and LNASAtop10 the independent varia-
bles. The use of the RLS method of estimation (see Doornik and Hendry, 1995) is chosen to
graphically illustrate the presence of structural breaks. The methodology employed by the
recursive method of estimation of a model for a sample with T observations is to apply
successive OLS estimates to the model starting with M observations (M<T), and then fit
the model to M+1, M+2,... up to T observations (Doornik and Hendry, 1995: 140). This way
a number of successive residual sums of squares are obtained based on which a sequence
of tests for structural breaks and parameter constancy can be conducted (ibid: 268). Two
graphics-based tests for parameter constancy are presented. The top graph presents the
one-step residuals test, where the one-step residuals of  yt - xtbt (StepRes) are bordered
by plus and minus two standard deviations from M to T sample observations (2SE and -
2SE, respectively). Points outside the boundaries reveal coefficient changes. The lower
graph presents the one-step Chow test, which is based on one-step forecast tests (TChow)
following the F-distribution with 1, t-k-1 degrees of freedom for t=M,...,T and a null of
parameter constancy (Doornik and Hendry, 1995: 328). Points above a chosen (5%) level
of significance in the diagram (CLevel) reveal the time period for which the null is rejected.
Both graphs are for M=5 and reveal a major structural break in 1994, as expected. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 230
US industry in the 1990s reveals major improvements over the RLS estimation
(Figure 2). All variables are significant, have the expected sign and the explanatory
power of the model is very high (89%). As expected, there is a negative and
significant relationship between LSENASA and the relative size of non-competitive
contracts with the coefficient of LSENASA equal to -0.42. The interpretation of this is
that a one US$ change in SENASA leads to a 0.42 cents change in the opposite
direction of NASAnc contracts. As a result, downward trends in the NASA space
expenditure post-Cold War are resulting in upward changes in the non-competitive
contracting value.
To measure the impact of the structural break taking place around the mid-
1990s on the level of competition in NASA contracts, we can re-estimate the
relationship of Table 2 without the step dummy variable with sample range from
1974 to 1997 and forecast the period from 1998 to 2003. The numerical difference
between the forecasted and the actual value is an approximation of the impact of
the industrial consolidation on the level of competition in NASA’s contracting
behaviour. The forecasts are thus expected to be significantly lower than the
actual value of LNASAnc throughout the forecast period. The performance of the
relevant estimation was much poorer than that in Table 2 (all right hand side
Table 2 . Modelling LNASAnc by OLS (1974 to 2003)
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value  r²
Constant -0.78 3.15 -0.25 0.00
LSENASA -0.42 0.12 -3.39 0.31
LNASAtop10 1.92 0.58  3.31 0.30
s1994 0.58 0.05 12.41 0.86
R² = 0.89, F(3, 26) = 71.12 [0.00]  DW = 1.44; RSS = 0.26 for 4 variables and 30 observations.
The diagnostics reveal no problems with autocorrelation, ARCH effects, or normality of the
error term (probabilities in brackets):
AR 1- 2F( 2, 24) = 1.23 [0.31]
ARCH F( 1, 24)=  0.00 [0.95]
Normality Chi(2) = 0.13 [0.94]
Notes: LNASAnc: the logarithm of the value of the NASA non-competitive contracts as a
percentage of the total value awarded; LSENASA: the log of NASA space appropriations at
constant 1999 prices; LNASAtop10: the log of NASA contracted value to the top 10 firms
as a percentage of the total appropriations; s1994: step dummy variable capturing
consolidation-effects of the US space industry in the mid-1990s. Data sources: NASA
(1983) to (2004a) and NASA (2004b).231 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMPETITION IN SPACE AGENCY PROCUREMENT?
variables insignificant and an R-square of 0.2). In addition, the forecast values
were persistently lower than the actual ones.  On average, from 1998 to 2003, the
actual percentage value of contracts awarded by NASA on a non-competitive
basis were 12.5% higher than they would be without taking into account the
consolidation of the US industry. The forecast error varied between 0.23 in 1998
and 0.21 in 2001 with no strong trend, so a single dummy seems adequate.2
Given the absence of empirical evidence on the comparative impact of
competitive and non-competitive contracts on profit margins, we must be cautious
about making inferences that NASA’s awarding policy is expected to lead to an
increasing profit stream for the US space industry. A safer conclusion is that since
the mid-1990s, NASA procurement with regards to the level of competition applied
in the awarding process has resulted in less competitive outcomes, driven primarily
by industrial consolidation and a diminished “pool” of contractors.
IV. Rent control and contract distribution
Rent control can also be achieved in the absence of competition, through the
alternative use of specific types of contracts that provide the right type of
incentives, but this can be at the expense of higher program-costs as we will see
later. Information asymmetries between the agent and the principal and monitoring
costs make this mechanism less preferred to the “invisible hand” of competition.
In practice, NASA policy calls for price competition when possible, as “Normally
effective price competition results in realistic pricing and a fixed-price contract is
ordinarily in the Government’s interest” (NASA 1998: 4).3 The preference for fixed
price contracts over the cost-plus type of contracts is explained on the grounds
that the government bears less of the program risk and the firm has stronger
incentives to be cost-efficient.
2 In contrast, when the estimation of Table 2 was done with 6 forecasts (1998-2003), the
forecast standard error varied from 0.116 to 0.123 and the actual percentage value of contracts
awarded by NASA on a non-competitive basis from 1998 to 2003 were on average just 3%
higher than the forecasted values.
3 On the other hand, NASA guidelines of contracting include price competition, price analysis,
cost analysis, type and complexity of the requirement and urgency of the requirement (NASA
1998). Such guidelines allow room for discretion. The possibility of collusion between major
space integrators arises to exploit such discretionary policies especially during the presence of
large scale programs (Moon, Mars exploration). For example, the awarding of contracts has to
ensure that both Boeing and Lockheed Martin maintain their space business, so there is no
possibility of ‘winner takes all’ procurement policy implementation (see Zervos 2001). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 232
The generic nature and uncertainties of most major government-led space
programs, as in other high technology industries, give rise to the formation of
incomplete contracts within the industry. Thus, program-specific costs that imply
a long term relationship between the supplier and the agency are often necessary,
and it is costly (and of uncertain benefit) to include uncertainty clauses in contracts.
There are three main contract categories used by NASA: Fixed-price contacts,
cost-reimbursement contracts and incentive contracts.
Fixed price contracts (FP) are of two types: Firm-fixed price contracts and fixed
price contracts with economic adjustment. As stated earlier, fixed price contracts
are in the government interest, provided there is competition in their awarding and
there are no major uncertainties associated with the program/components. Cost
reimbursement (CR) contracts employed by NASA are of two main types: Cost
plus fixed fee (CPFF) and cost plus award fee (CPAF). Other types, such as cost
plus percentage profit are excluded because they give strong incentives to the
industry to inflate costs. CPAF contracts are classified as such by NASA since
1983; prior to this date the relevant contracts were placed under the “Incentive-
contract” classification.4
Finally, incentive contracts (INC) can be used with regards to cost, or
performance incentives, and provide a mix between the extremes of cost-but-no -
rent minimization of FP contracts and rent-but-no-cost minimization of CR contracts
(see Zervos 2001).
Figure 3 presents data of NASA contract types as a percentage of the total
from 1983 to 2004. It is clear from Figure 3 that cost-reimbursement contracts
(CPAF plus CPFF) constitute the largest share of the total since 1983. On this
basis, profit minimization, or regulation of profits are seen as major priorities in
NASA’s behavior in awarding contracts to the industry over time. However, Figure
3 also indicates a decline of cost plus contracts as a percentage of the total since
1990, to be matched by a respective increase in incentive contracts (“mirror image”).
This pattern could signal a more rent-favoring approach by NASA from the mid-
1990s. Such an approach resulted in 2000 in a contract distribution similar to the
mid-1980s (with CPAF below the 50% mark and INC around the 30% mark). The
4 Prior to 1983, NASA classification of contract types did not contain cost-plus-award-fee
(CPAF) contracts, but only firm-fixed-price (FFP), incentive (INC) and cost-plus-fixed-fee
(CPFF).  Therefore, for reasons of compatibility the sample of the time series examination of
contract distribution is set from 1983 to 2003. Furthermore, given that the relative distribution
of contracts is important and to avoid unnecessary price effects the values of the contract-
types time series are presented as a percentage of the total value of NASA awards.233 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMPETITION IN SPACE AGENCY PROCUREMENT?
FFP series show a marginally increase since the early 1990s indicating that the
FBC policy did not have a major effect on this type of contract. This means that
NASA during the second half of the mid-1990s moved from placing greater emphasis
on rent extraction to placing increased priority on cost minimization, reflected in a
decreasing proportion of contracts awarded under cost-reimbursement schemes.
In order to test whether there was a substitution effect between non-competitive
contacts and CPAF contracts by NASA towards controlling rent to the industry,
the equation in Table 2 was estimated with the inclusion of LCPAF (the logarithm
of CPAF). This had no impact on the explanatory power of the equation; in addition
the tests on the significance of right hand variables indicated its absence for
LCPAF. Overall, correlation and visual inspection indicate the absence of a
meaningful link between all the explanatory variables of the behavior of the level of
competitive tendering (LNASAnc) and the type of contract distribution (LCPAF),
with the exception of budget size (LSENASA). This means that changes in
Figure 3. Contract types employed by NASA as a percentage
of total space expenditure
Notes: CPAF, INC, FFP and CPFF stand for Cost plus award fee, incentive, firm fixed price
and cost plus fixed fee respectively. All variables are percentages of the total value
awarded annually. Data sources: NASA (1983) to (2004a). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 234
budgetary appropriations affect the behavior of competitive tendering and type of
contract distribution in very different and non-systematic ways. An econometric
approach in modeling the behavior of LCPAF is expected to be of limited use,
given the very small sample size. Nevertheless, the modeling was done for purposes
of illustration and to further test for whether competitive tendering affected contract
distribution. The inclusion of LNASAnc at all stages of the relevant estimation
revealed no explanatory power of the relevant variable in affecting the behavior of
LCPAF. Table 3 shows that budgetary appropriations and program-specific policies
(s2001) are important determinants of the behavior of LCPAF since the early 1980s.
The results in Table 3 are not very good in terms of the diagnostic analysis,
given the presence of autocorrelation. The use of first differences, lags, or tests for
omitted variables (LNASAnc) did not improve the performance. It must be noted
that the limitations of econometric approaches in explaining the behavior of NASA’s
contract distribution through time are significant. Limited sample range availability
is a severe constraint on top of the inherent constraint of dealing with variables
that relate to centrally controlled procurement choices. The illustration purposes
of this exercise further reinforce the visual evidence that post-mid-1990s there has
been a decrease in LCPAF, which indicates that NASA’s contract distribution is
unlikely to compensate for the reduction in competitive tendering for the same
time-period, as a rent-control mechanism.
In the absence of contestability from foreign firms in the US domestic public
space market, this appears to be in line with the results of Florens et al (1996). In
Table 3. Modelling LCPAF by OLS (1983 to 2003)
Variable Coefficient Std.Error t-value  r²
LSENASA 0.85 0.23 3.69 0.43
Constant -3.91 2.17 -1.80 0.15
s2001 -0.32 0.09 -3.80 0.43
R² = 0.57 F(2, 16) = 5.34 [0.02]  DW = 0.66; RSS = 0.35 for 3 variables and 21 observations.
The diagnostic tests reveal a problem of autocorrelation, but no problems with ARCH
effects, or normality of the error term (probabilities in parenthesis):
AR 1- 2F(2, 16)  =  5.34 [0.02]
ARCH F(1, 16)  = 2.08 [0.17]
Normality Chi(2)=  0.30 [0.86]
Note: for an explanation of the variables and data sources, see Tables 1 and 2.235 WHATEVER HAPPENED TO COMPETITION IN SPACE AGENCY PROCUREMENT?
policy terms, the diminishing of rent-control mechanisms can have substantial
implications for the industry. On the one hand, it is possible that coupled with
increased consolidation and the exploitation of economies of scale, efficiency
gains can be enhanced by increasing investment in R&D and lower program costs.
Commercial markets can also benefit from economies of scope and dual-use
technologies and R&D. On the other hand, this procurement pattern can have a
negative effect on the competitiveness of the US space industry in commercial
markets. The reason for this is that the US space industry has no incentive to
improve its competitiveness in commercial space markets, given the high rents it
enjoys in the domestic US public market. This can potentially lead to a moral
hazard situation, where the US space industry has an incentive to under-perform
in commercial space markets. The impact of NASA procurement policy (as seen
developed post-mid 1990s) on the efficiency and competitiveness of the US space
industry is ambiguous and an important research area for the future.
V. Conclusions
This paper examined NASA’s behaviour with regards to its procurement policies.
The analysis shows that the consolidation of the US space industry (with two
major integrators Lockheed Martin and Boeing) combined with absence of overseas
competition results in a high proportion of non-competitive contracts awarded to
the space industry. In addition, the examination of the behaviour of contract types
awarded indicates the absence of a rent-controlling mechanism to compensate for
the shrinking of competitive tendering contracts. The potential emergence of
powerful producer groups and their role needs to be further examined with respect
to their impact on the procurement process of NASA and other space agencies.
This will assist to understand better the costs incurred by the public sectors in
their efforts to improve industrial efficiency and the competitiveness of the domestic
industries in commercial markets.
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